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Abstract 
The paper develops a balance of payments (BOP)-consistent procedure for estimating 
unreported flows. Using data between 1990 and 2007, total unreported flows of selected 
Asian countries is estimated at $4.7 trillion, or more than 80% of the countries’ 2007 total 
gross domestic product. Results reveal that unreported flows increase with reported and 
accumulated unreported flows. Financial depth and governance of the real sector decrease 
unreported flows, whereas economic growth and weakness in the governance of reported 
flows increase unreported flows. Results also reveal that unbalanced financial and real 
sector development contributes to the unreported flows. Lastly, the paper argues that 
there is an opportunity to reverse the situation through a judicious application of capital 
flow and trade flow management techniques and development and improvement in 
capacity, including governance, to internalize resources and converting them into desired 
outcomes.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The balance of payments (BOP) records the transactions of an open economy with the rest of the 
world within a specific period. It is supposed to present a comprehensive monetary expression of 
capital-, trade-, and labor-related flows of an open economy. 
 A number of studies, however, find that large amounts of cross-border flows remain 
unreported in the BOP (c.f., Erbe 1985, World Bank 1985, Cuddington 1986, Dooley 1986, and 
Morgan Guaranty 1986 on financial flight; Bhagwati 1974, Gulati 1987, Pak et al. 2003, and de 
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Boyrie et al. 2005 on trade misinvoicing; World Bank 2006 on unreported remittances; see also 
Lessard and Williamson 1987, Boyce and Ndikumana 2001, Collier et al. 2001, and Epstein 2005 
for integrative approaches). The problem is that unreported flows impose large costs that 
undermine economic development (c.f., Pastor 1990, Lopez 1996, Vos and Yap 1996, and Beja 
2009). Most studies examine how unreported flows undermine the ability of indebted countries to 
pay or service their mounting external debts. However, there are some studies that focus on the 
dynamics behind the leakages such as the ‘revolving door’ pattern between unreported flows and 
debts (c.f., Boyce 1992 and Ndikumana and Boyce 2003) as well as the linkages between 
unreported flows and foreign investment (c.f., Kant 1996), foreign aid (c.f., Collier et al. 2003), 
openness (c.f., Lensink et al. 1998, Aizenman 2006, and Bhattacharya 1999), or even some 
measure of risk (c.f., Dooley 1988; Alesina and Tabellini 1989, Hermes and Lensink 2001, and 
Lensink et al. 2000). This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on unreported flows.  
 Notwithstanding the breadth of the literature, there is to my knowledge no study that 
applies a BOP-consistent procedure in estimating unreported flows. The failure of these studies to 
employ BOP-consistent procedures can have deleterious effects on the stated size of total 
unreported flows. Furthermore, the extant literature takes only a fraction of reported flows when 
examining the dynamics of unreported flows. This paper proposes that the volume of reported 
flows should be used instead. Part II discusses the methodology then Part III presents the results. 
Part IV concludes the paper. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. Basic Concepts 
 
A BOP-consistent measure of unreported flows should adhere to BOP accounting principles, the 
first of which is the use of a double-entry reporting procedure: any inflow entry should have a 
counterpart outflow entry. The BOP-consistent approach stands as a stark contrast to what the 
extant literature uses in obtaining total unreported flow that is basically a straight-forward 
summation of the estimated values. 
 The second principle requires the placing of appropriate directional notations in the BOP. 
To be precise, an inflow corresponds to a positive notation while an outflow corresponds to a 
negative notation. According to the extant literature, capital flight should have a positive notation. 
But, in the BOP-consistent approach, it should have a negative notation. To illustrate the point, 
consider the following items: capital flight of $10 and export overinvoicing of $10. The latter has 
a negative notation by convention. Following the extant literature results in a total unreported 
flow of zero (i.e., $10 – $10 = 0). With correct directional notations, however, total unreported 
flow is $20 (i.e., –$10 –$10 = –$20). Disregarding directional notations therefore results in an 
error in the stated size of total unrecorded flow. 
 The third principle refers to the use of an equilibrium condition: total inflows should 
equal total outflows, thus an overall BOP balance of zero. Inaccuracies in data compilation are 
reflected as errors and omissions (EO). Because the individual components of the BOP are 
presumably statistically independent with respect to each other, data inaccuracies are random and 
the size of EO does not say anything about the accuracy of the BOP. As such, EO can play the 
role of a “balancing” or residual account.  
 Lastly, the structure of the BOP is defined by its main accounts: current accounts (CA), 
capital accounts (KA), financial accounts (FA), reserve assets and related items (CRES), and 
EO.1 According to economic theory, CA is backed by the financial and capital accounts (FKA) 
net of CRES. Putting EO for completeness, the BOP equation is: 
 CA = FKA – CRES – EO.       (1a)  
Then re-arranging terms obtains 
 FKA – CA – CRES – EO = 0,       (1b)  
where FKA = KA + FA. Consistent with BOP principles, any addition of +X and –Y in Equation 
1b should have the counterpart subtractions to keep the BOP zero; that is, 
 FKA – CA – CRES – EO + X – X – Y + Y = 0.     (1c)   
 In the context of unreported flows, the following procedure is introduced: the addition of 
an unreported flow Z has the counterpart entry –Z in CRES if it is in fact a de facto flow but in 
EO if it is only a de jure flow. The de facto label indicates real transactions. By construction, 
CRES includes foreign exchange, monetized gold, special drawing rights, and other related items. 
Monetary authorities exert effective control over these items. If the contention of the extant 
literature that an unreported flow is a ‘manifestation of the avoidance of social controls’ is valid 
then placing the counterpart entry in CRES is tantamount to introducing the counterfactual 
scenario that monetary authorities gained effective control over the funds.2 So the effect of the 
counterpart entry is to create a so-called ‘supplemental reserves’ in CRES. On the other hand, the 
de jure label refers to non-real transactions, covering valuation and data compilation adjustments 
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effects and idiosyncratic measurement outcomes. Placing a counterpart entry in EO is consistent 
with its function as a residual account. 
 
2.2. Capital and Financial Accounts 
 
One set of calculations deal with the capital and financial accounts. First, calculate net capital 
flight (NKF) as 
 CDET + NFI + KA– CA – CRES – EO = 0,     (2)  
where CDET is net debt inflows, NFI is net financial investment inflows, and the rest of the items 
are as defined earlier and comprise net outflows.3 Equation 2 reclassifies the financial accounts 
into two groups: debt-related (i.e., CDET) and investments items (i.e., NFI); that is, FA = CDET 
+ NFI. This regrouping of the financial accounts rules out double-counting. Except for debt-
related items, the other items in Equation 2 are available in the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF) International Financial Statistics. CDET is obtained from the World Bank’s (WB) Global 
Development Finance.4 A positive balance in Equation 2 means an unreported de facto outflow, 
whereas negative balance means ‘reverse’ capital flight.  
 Putting the negative notation for BOP-consistent reporting, Equation 1b becomes 
 (FA – KF) + KA – CA – (CRES – KF) – EO = 0.    (1d)  
Notice –KF is reported in FA because it is a type of ‘other investment’ and its counterpart entry, 
+KF, is reported in CRES.5 To illustrate, suppose capital flight is $15. Other accounts the same, 
the BOP-consistent entries are: 
 
BOP of Country  
FA, other investment: capital flight – $15 
CRES: supplemental reserves  + $15 
Balance $0 
 
Recording $15 in CRES indicates that the reported CRES is understated by an amount equal to 
the supplemental reserves that covers for net capital flight. 
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4 Eggerstedt et al. (1993), Chang et al. (1997), and Beja (2006) for a discussion on data sources. 
5 Vos (1992) on capital flight as a type of ‘other investment’ flow. 
 There are other adjustments on CDET and NFI. One adjustment is for exchange rates 
fluctuation-effects. Debt and financial investments are undertaken in different currencies but are 
often reported using a reference hard currency like US dollar. Exchange rate fluctuations affect 
the valuation CDET and NFI and affect the respective reported flows. 
 Take CDET, for instance. Exchange rate fluctuations that result in a debt inflow is de jure 
increase in indebtedness because there is only an accounting adjustment. There is no actual flow 
reported in the BOP. Data on the changes in indebtedness due to exchange rate fluctuations 
(CDETFX adj.) are available from the WB Global Development Finance, but it is possible to 
calculate them as well, as follows. First compute: 
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where DEBTFX t-1 is outstanding debt adjusted for exchange rate fluctuation, DEBTLONG is long-
term debt; αi is the proportion of DEBTLONG in major hard currencies like European euro, British 
pound, French franc, German mark, Japanese yen, and Swiss franc; βi is the share of DEBTLONG 
in US dollar and in multiple or in other currencies; FX is the exchange rate between a hard 
currency to US dollar; IMF is the use of IMF credits; SDR is the exchange rate between special 
drawing rights and US dollar; and DEBTSHORT is short-term debts.6 All things the same, an 
appreciation in a hard currency decreases
1 ti,
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−
 and DEBTFX t-1, too. It follows that
7  
 CDETFX adj. = ∆DEBTFX t-1 – ∆DEBT,      (4)   
where ∆ means change and DEBT is outstanding debt unadjusted for exchange rate fluctuation. 
Proceeding from Equation 1b,  
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 FA + (KA + CDETFX adj.) – CA – CRES – (EO + CDETFX adj.) = 0.  (1e)  
The other de jure flows are debt reductions or forgiveness, debt rescheduling, changes in debt 
arrears, and a so-called ‘debt stock-flow reconciliation’. The first three items are easy to grasp, 
but last one is basically a catch-all item for data inconsistencies and/or idiosyncratic borrowing 
patterns that cannot be explained or reconciled using identified debt accounts. These de jure 
flows are likewise available from the WB Global Development Finance. In these cases, however, 
the amounts are entered in KA because they are neither investments- nor portfolio-type flows. To 
illustrate the BOP-consistent entries, suppose an increase in debt due to exchange rate fluctuation 
of $10, debt forgiveness of $5, and debt stock-flow reconciliation for other unaccounted inflow of 
$15. Other accounts the same, the BOP appears as follows: 
 
BOP of Country  
KA: inflow of debt + $10 
KA: debt forgiveness – $  5 
KA: debt stock-flow reconciliation + $15 
EO:  – $20 
Balance $0 
 
As a result of these unreported flows, the reported EO is overstated by net total amount of all de 
jure adjustments.  
 The procedures for adjusting NFI – comprising foreign direct investments (FDI) and 
portfolio equities (PORT) – are essentially the same to the ones described for CDET. Thus, the 
impact of foreign exchange fluctuations on the US dollar valuation of foreign direct investments 
(FDIFX adj.) and portfolio equities (PORTFX adj.) are obtained: FDI FX t-1 – FDI and PORT FX t-1 – 
PORT. Then these amounts are reported as de jure flows. As with trade misinvoicing (see below), 
the discrepancies in the reported FDI and PORT between the source- and receiving-countries are 
obtained. Under- or over-unreported flows are de facto flows. The BOP-consistent entries are 
straightforward to implement. 
 
2.3. Current Accounts 
 
The other set of calculations deal with the current accounts. Trade misreporting produces 
unreported flows. Export over-reporting (under-reporting) results in unreported de facto outflow 
(inflow) of funds, whereas import over-reporting (under-reporting) brings about unreported de 
facto inflow (outflow) of funds. Their counterpart entries are reported in CRES as required. 
 The procedure outlined below calculates trade misreporting by trade flows analysis that 
utilize aggregate data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.8 Commodity-level trade data 
from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics can be used as well. Since imports data are 
reported in the IMF International Financial Statistics as ‘free-on-board’ while those from the 
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics include ‘cost-of-insurance-and freight’ (CIF), it is necessary to 
first transform the data as ‘free-on-board’ before proceeding to calculate trade misreporting. 
Thus, the calculated values then are ‘pure’ misreported trade flows. 
To compute export misreporting (XMIS), the reported imports of trade-partners (MPARTNER) 
from own-country are compared with reported exports of own-country (XOWN) to trade-partners:  
 XMIS = MPARTNER – XOWN.       (5a)  
Positive XMIS means export under-reporting and negative XMIS means export over-reporting. To 
compute import misreporting (MMIS), the reported import of own-country (MOWN) from trade-
partners is compared with the reported export of trade partners (XPARTNER) to own-country: 
 MMIS = MOWN – XPARTNER.       (5b)  
Positive MMIS means import over-reporting and negative MMIS means import under-reporting.  
 For aggregate exports (XMIS TOTAL) and imports misreporting (MMIS TOTAL), first, get the 
reciprocal of key trade-partners’ shares to own-country’s exports (XPARTNER SHARE) and imports 
(MPARTNER SHARE) then multiply then to Equations 5a and 5b, respectively: 
 
SHARE PARTNER
MIS
TOTAL MIS
X
X
X =        (6a)  
 
SHARE PARTNER
MIS
TOTAL MIS
M
M
M = ·       (6b)  
The sum of Equations 6a and 6b is called net trade misreporting. Next, XMIS TOTAL and MMIS TOTAL 
are entered as corrections to the reported exports and imports, respectively, in the trade accounts 
of CA. Their counterpart entries are reported in CRES. Proceeding from Equation 1b, thus 
 FA + KA – (CA – XMIS TOTAL – MMIS TOTAL) – (CRES + XMIS TOTAL  (1f)   
 + MMIS TOTAL) – EO = 0. 
 To illustrate the adjustments, suppose Country-A over-reports its exports to Country-B by 
$10. For simplicity, suppose Country B does not misreport trade. Suppose further that the true 
value of exports to Country-B is $40. There is a presumption is that actual trade flows are being 
reported by countries, and so the initial BOPs are: 
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     BOP of Country-A   BOP of Country-B  
CA, exports +$50  CA, imports –$40 
FA, other investments –$50  FA, other investments +$40 
Balance $  0  Balance $  0 
 
Trade flow analysis reveals the extent of export misreporting. Other accounts the same, the BOP-
consistent adjustments in Country-A are: 
 
BOP of Country-A  
CA, trade: exports over-reporting  –$10 
CRES: supplemental reserves +$10 
Balance $  0 
 
The recording of $10 in CRES indicates that the reported CRES is understated by an amount 
equal to the supplemental reserves of $10 that covers for exports over-reporting. Both countries 
have mirror balances in their trade accounts after adjustment, but their financial accounts show 
different balances precisely because of the unreported de facto outflow of $10.  
 The shipment of merchandise is another possible avenue for unreported de facto flow. 
For simplicity, the estimation of shipping cost misinvoicing (SHIPMIS) is done using an index of 
shipment cost misinvoicing (MIS Index).9 
 SHIPMIS = TRADENET * MIS Index,      (7)  
where TRADENET = XOWN – MOWN. Positive SHIPMIS means net overcharging in exports shipment, 
whereas negative means net overcharging in imports shipment. SHIPMIS is reported in the services 
accounts of CA. Suppose export shipping misinvoicing is $1, the modified BOP of Country-A is: 
 
BOP of Country-A  
CA, Export: exports over-reporting – $10 
CA, Services: shipment overcharging + $  1 
CRES: supplemental reserves + $  9 
Balance $0 
 
 The final adjustment in the current accounts involves unreported remittance (UNR), which 
is an important unreported de facto flow if informal remittance is a significant practice for 
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An alternative is to use the CIF in the calculation. The extant literature uses 1.1 as a standard value of CIF, 
but the best approach is to use the actual CIF values of individual countries. However, not all countries 
report CIF data. 
remitting funds. Estimating UNR is done using an index of remittance misreporting (UNR 
Index).10  
 UNR = REM * UNR Index.       (8)  
Proceeding from Equation 1b, 
 FA + KA – (CA + UNR) – (CRES – UNR) – EO = 0.    (1g)   
To illustrate, suppose an unreported remittance of +$4. Other accounts the same, the BOP 
corrections are: 
 
 BOP of Country  
CA, Income: unreported remittance + $4 
CRES: supplemental reserves – $4 
Balance $0 
 
With the reporting of unreported de facto inflow, the reported CRES is overstated by the amount 
of supplemental reserves. 
 
2.4. Other Calculations 
 
If unreported flows are reported correctly with their counterpart adjustments, the overall balance 
of the BOP is zero.11 More specifically, the sum of de facto and de jure flows equals the sum of 
supplemental reserves and errors and omissions adjustments. Thus, by necessity, net unreported 
flow is zero. In the extant literature, net unreported flows may not be zero as explained in section 
2.1 earlier. It also necessarily follows that the relevant measure for BOP-consistent analysis is the 
volume of unreported flows (UNREP), defined as: 
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REMIT
 (c.f., Beja 2006). 
11 The discussion in the earlier sections disregards what happens to a de facto flow. Following equilibrium 
principle, a de facto outflow from, say, Country-A should end up somewhere. It is possible that a de facto 
outflow is declared as other investments inflow in Country-A and the BOP still balances. Or perhaps the de 
facto outflow ends up in another location, say, Country-C. The BOP entries in the third country might be: 
other investments inflow of +X with the corresponding imports of –X or own-country other investments 
abroad of –X or accumulation of reserves of –X, or a combination of such transactions provided that the 
total is –X. Other accounts the same, the flows are fully accounted and the BOP of Country-C is zero. The 
same logic applies for a de facto inflow to Country-A. Notice how an unreported de facto flow becomes a 
legitimate flow thereby making something illicit into something legitimate. 
 UNREP = ∑
i
abs (unreported flowi),       (9) 
where i represent all unreported flows derived using the procedures described earlier. To make 
UNREP comparable across periods, the real value is obtained using the US consumer price index 
(CPI) as deflator:  
 UNREPREAL =
BASECPI
UNREP
·        (10) 
In addition, the share of unreported flows (UNREPSHARE) gives the relative burden of unreported 
flows for cross country comparison: 
 UNREPSHARE = 
REAL
REAL
 GDP
 UNREP
· 100,       (11) 
where GDPREAL is real gross domestic product of own-country deflated using CPI. 
 
2.2. Econometrics 
 
Well managed cross-border capital, trade, and labor flows produce agreeable results like economic 
expansion along with rising household incomes and welfare.12 The converse is true: ill managed 
flows result in perverse outcomes like interruptions or deteriorations in economic performance 
that bring about social disruptions and household misery. The contention in this paper is that 
cross-border flows management is linked to the capacity (ABSORB) of an economy to not only 
take in but also transform resources into desirable outcomes.  
 For any given level of ABSORB, increasing reported flows (REP) generates unreported 
flows (UNREP). The reasoning behind the argument is simple: if capacity is fixed, an economy is 
unable to properly use all additional resources from cross-border flows and the unused funds spill 
out as unreported flows. The corollary to this hypothesis is the following: given REP, ABSORB 
is negatively correlated with UNREP. It is also hypothesized that UNREP is positively correlated 
with the accumulation of unreported flows (UNREPSTOCK). Simply put, UNREP generates a self-
replicating process that drives further leakages. These three propositions constitute the following 
model: 
 UNREP = α REP + β UNREPSTOCK + γj ABSORBj + δi Xi + u + ε  (12)   
where X is a vector of risk-related indicators, u represents fixed effects, and ε is a residual term. 
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(2007) for capital flows and Frankel and Romer (1999) for trade flows. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) present critiques. 
REP, UNREPSTOCK, and ABSORB comprise the core indicators of the model. Define  
 REPREAL =
BASE
i
 CPI
) flow  (reported abs i∑
       (13) 
where i covers all BOP-reported inflows and outflows. Like Equation 10, Equation 13 disregards 
the directional notations to obtain volume of flows. Also define 
 UNREPSTOCK = UNREPSTOCK-1 + UNREPREAL + ∆UNREPREAL,   (14) 
where ∆ means change. The last term is a correction process that takes the following values: 
 ∆UNREPREAL =   
0∆UNREP if∆UNREP
0∆UNREP if0
REALREAL
REAL
<
> 
   (15) 
Equation 15 takes a value of zero to avoid double-counting, and so only negative values perform 
the correction process. UNREP becomes smaller a reported flows are progressively managed, 
resulting in a smaller UNREPSTOCK in the end. 
 ABSORB is operationalized as financial sector depth and real sector depth. The former 
implies greater funds intermediation and the latter, greater production possibilities. The proxies 
for financial sector depth are money supply (MONEY) and quantity of domestic credit (CREDIT). 
MONEY is quasi money, which is considered as a broad measure for financial intermediation. 
CREDIT is total credit provided by the monetary authorities and banking institutions to different 
sectors in the economy including government; it is the best measure for funds intermediation.  
 The proxies for real sector depth are size of manufacturing sector (MANUF) and gross 
capital formation (KFORM). MANUF is output value added of (major) manufacturing industries, 
and so it is a limited measure of productive possibilities. KFORM is the level of private domestic 
investments corresponding to additions in fixed assets and inventories; it is the best measure for 
productive possibilities.  
 Financial sector depth benefits the real sector as funds intermediation gives rise to the 
effective use of resources, both sourced internally or externally. That segment in the real sector 
that exhibits increasing returns gains more from such development. Of course, as the real sector 
expands with more investments, there comes more demand for funds intermediation. In short, 
there are complementarities between the financial and real sectors. The pairings of the ABSORB 
indicators provide alternative specifications of Equation 12 and tests for robustness. 
 As mentioned earlier, UNREP is a manifestation of the avoidance of social controls. Such 
avoidance is presumably the response to perceived risks. The contention is that a negative risk 
increases UNREP.13 Risk is operationalized as economic growth rate (GROW), government 
                                                 
13 This conception is inspired by Berlin (1958) and Sen (1999). Positive risk implies positive freedom, thus 
spending (GOVT), and quality of governance (GOVN).14 
 GROW is normally a positive risk because it means more opportunities and capacity to 
absorb flows. It is, however, possible that a deluge of external funds following rapid economic 
expansion can overwhelm an economy. GROW can therefore become a negative risk. To bypass 
simultaneity problems between GROW and ABSORB, GOVT, as well as GOVN, lagged GROW 
is used in the model. 
 GOVT represents government participation in the domestic economy in general, which, 
in the developmental tradition, represents a positive risk.15 Indeed, there are plenty of cases where 
funds intermediation and domestic industrialization were facilitated by some form of government 
intervention. On the other hand, wasteful and duplicating activities eventually strain government 
finances that invite structural adjustments. Inconsistencies and confusing policies, weaknesses in 
regulation, malfeasance and corruption, intrusion of political interests undermine the efficacy of 
government participation in the economy and become bases for the removal of government from 
participating in the economy. Where capacity is limited, government involvement in the economy 
generates leakages. GOVT can thus also exist as a negative risk.  
 GOVN stands for the quality of institutionalized authority, measured as the level of civil 
and political liberties. There is accountability and security if democracy is real. When property 
rights are well defined and protected, people feel safe against undue processes and summary 
actions of government. People are able to better participate in social and economic processes 
under positive governance. Conversely, democracy without the support institutions that ensure 
democratic processes generates anxiety and disappointment. Predation and state capture of a 
minority introduce institutional decay. Unpredictability, insecurity, and unevenness prompt the 
avoidance of social controls. Accordingly, GOVN can be a positive or negative risk.  
 The interaction terms are also relevant risk indicators. The positive governance of flows 
promotes efficiency and expansion that enhances absorption of resources and lessen leakages. 
Conversely, weak or weakening governance of flows results in leakages. Moreover, the positive 
governance of the financial sector disciplines casino-like activities, encourages long-term 
investments, and promotes real sector deepening. But the result of the interaction term of 
                                                                                                                                                 
capability and space to work towards something desirable. Positive freedom also implies an involvement in 
the governance towards some desired end. Negative risk implies negative freedom, which means restraints.  
14 Arguably, the role of price (as risk indicator) is irrelevant in using the volumes of flows. The implication 
is that flows are more regulation rather than market allocation issues. 
15 There is an extensive literature on the role of an activist government in development (c.f., Johnson 1982, 
Amsden 1989, Haggard 1990, Wade 1990, Weiss and Hobson 1995, and Chang 2002). 
governance and financial sector depth only reveals the extent to which governance affects the 
domestic financial sector. Positive governance of the real sector leads to coordination of activities 
that promotes balanced expansion and deepening. There is coherence of policies as demonstrated 
by context-based interventions and systematic approach to reforms. Yet again, weak governance 
guarantees the transformation of the real sector not only as a source of loot but also as conduit for 
leakages. Lastly, the spending of democratic governments is generally considered transparent and 
responsible but that of undemocratic governments is dubious and indulgent. The former generates 
confidence and the latter, anxiety. Therefore, the coefficients of the interaction terms depend on 
whether they reflect positive or negative risks. 
 GOVN data are taken from the Polity IV database. The rest of the indicators are from the 
WB World Development Indicators. Except for GOVN and GROW, data are transformed as 
shares of GDP to minimize estimation biases caused by own-country size effects.16 Estimation is 
done using pooled regression following a general-to-specific regression strategy wherein non-core 
indicators that come out as not statistically significant are removed then the more parsimonious 
model is estimated until the best results are obtained. 
  
III. RESULTS 
 
Table 1 summarizes the unreported flows (UNREP) of ten Asian countries for the period 1990 to 
2007 and Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. There is increasing UNREP in both levels and 
shares, except in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Among the four, the reduction in Sri 
Lanka’s share is not significant but those of the other three countries do not vary much between 
decades that is why small changes are significant relative to the overall trend.  
 At first glance at the numbers, there appears to be sub-groupings with regards to UNREP. 
For instance, shares of East Asian countries are generally larger than 10% of GDP (except for 
Thailand). Those for South Asian countries fall below 10% (except for Nepal). This difference is 
perhaps caused by the volume of reported flows, with East Asia receiving far more than South 
Asia because of rapid economic growth and larger market size. 
 Upon closer inspection, though, the seeming associations between shares and 
characteristics of countries disappear. Consider the following observations. For China, the largest 
economy in the group with regards to total output, UNREP is 14% of GDP; yet Nepal, the 
smallest economy in the group, UNREP is 11% of GDP. China is also the fastest growing 
economy; but the Philippines, the economic laggard in the group, reports UNREP of about 23% 
                                                 
16 GOVN is in a scale from -10 (dictatorship) to 10 (democratic). 
of GDP. What is more, UNREP of the largest countries in terms of population differs. Compare 
China with India; the latter has the smallest UNREP of 5% of GDP. For less populated countries 
like Malaysia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, shares exceed 10% of GDP. Moreover, in Malaysia, which 
is the most progressive country in the group with respect to the Human Development Index 
(HDI), UNREP exceeds 20% of GDP. In contrast, the low HDI countries of Nepal and 
Bangladesh have an average 9% of GDP. Clearly, regression analysis must distill the 
determinants of UNREP given these differing qualities. Total UNREP of the group for whole 
period reached $4.7 trillion, or more than 80% of their 2007 GDP. 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about Here] 
 
 Correcting for unreported flows changes the balance of payments (BOP) in remarkable 
ways. Take the 1990 BOP of the Philippines as illustration (Table 3). 
 The reported current accounts of the Philippines in 1990 indicate a deficit of $2.6 billion. 
Trade flow analysis uncovered under-reporting in exports and imports of $691 million and $1.8 
billion, respectively. Other current accounts items need adjustments for shipping misinvoicing of 
$122 million and unreported remittances of $48 million. With the corrections, the current 
accounts report a larger deficit of $3.8 billion. In the financial accounts, the reported figure is a 
surplus of about $2 billion. ‘Reverse’ capital flight in 1990 of $62 million raised the surplus to 
$2.1 billion. Notice that unreported de facto flows reported in the current and financial accounts 
equal the supplemental reserves of $1.1 billion under reserves and related assets.  
 Meanwhile, reported capital accounts of the Philippines indicate a zero amount. The debt 
stock-flow reconciliation and other de jure flows raised the capital accounts surplus to $805 
million. That amount is subtracted from the reported error and omissions of $594 million, 
resulting in a revised figure of $212 million.  
 The last row of Table 3 gives total unreported flows for the year. Basically, the steps are 
the same for succeeding years. For comparison, the 2000 BOP of the Philippines is appended to 
the 1990 records. (Appendix 1 contains the revised BOP of each of the ten countries).  
 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
 
 Table 4 summarizes the results of various model specifications. Government spending is 
a statistically insignificant negative risk and the interaction between governance and government 
spending is a statistically insignificant positive risk. Perhaps unreported flows from government 
spending occur in a roundabout manner as transactions are facilitated by soft budget constraints, 
which trouble the ten countries in this study. The findings lend credence to the contention that 
better application of government spending means less resources ending up as leakage. Clearly, 
there is a need for government to perform a positive role because it needs to get rid of 
development obstacles but also provide an environment that enlarges absorptive capabilities. 
 The initial runs reveal that governance does not significantly contribute to unreported 
flows. At first glance, this finding suggests that the results are applicable regardless of the type of 
government operating in each country. Alternatively, the findings suggest that providing political 
freedom alone is not enough to bring about progress in general and reductions in unreported 
flows in particular. Upon closer inspection, this finding is not surprising at all. At one level, the 
civic and political liberties of the counties have remained stable or exhibited little improvement 
within the period under study. On another level, the GOVN is an average measure and as a catch-
all index it is possible that the statistically insignificant results is the consequence of data that are 
rather amalgamated and thus cannot display the nuances of governance. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
 
 Removing statistically insignificant non-core indicators exposes significant relationships 
that explain unreported flows. Models 5 to 8 indicate that, on average, 0.09 units of unreported 
flows stem from each unit of reported flow. Additional unreported flows come from the swelling 
of unreported flows (i.e., UNREPSTOCK), averaging about 0.13 units. The interaction term between 
governance and reported flows indicates a weakness in managing flows that adds 0.02 units to 
unreported flows. Perhaps, this condition stems from the way some of the ten countries have 
embarked on financial liberalization with limited compensatory measures to handle the surge in 
flows following the opening of the economy. Strong economic growth increases unreported flows 
because it not only brings in external funds but also expands domestic resources, yet these are not 
well absorbed by the economy. The interaction of governance and financial sector depth is 
notable, albeit the size of the coefficient is quite small. Perhaps, this finding is consistent with the 
opinion that monetary authorities of the ten countries enjoy some autonomy in their governance 
of the financial sector.  
 But results on financial sector depth and real sector depth reveal severe limitations on the 
capacities to take in available resources. In general, the results imply an unbalanced development 
pattern in the domestic economy. Although funds intermediation reduces unreported flows, 
shallow industrialization results in leakages. The financial sector is thus not a likely conduit for 
unreported flows. The net effect of these opposing processes is 0.16 units of unreported flow for 
each unit of uneven development. 
 The quality of governance has to improve in order for the financial sector to expand its 
role in the economy. The success of the financial sector rests, in part, on the success of the real 
sector. The success of the real sector, in turn, is contingent on the quality of governance in 
economic coordination and planning. This notion is reinforced by the statistically significant 
negative interaction term between governance and real sector indicators, of about 0.02 units. 
Altogether, around 0.39 units for each unit of funds coming from cross-border flows and domestic 
resources become unreported flows; or, more specifically, 0.22 units from cross-border flows and 
0.17 units from domestic resources. 
 The implications of these results are valuable for the management of an economy because 
imbalances in governance and development can lead to a systemic exploitation of the weaker 
system. Reforms are therefore necessary to change the existing configuration.  
The results reiterate the need for increased regulation.17 In the context of cross-border 
flows, an important step is the application of capital flow management techniques, which are 
tools for directing flows to activities that bring forth the most desirable outcomes. These tools 
help establish a policy space for designing programs that are appropriate to the domestic 
circumstances and makes balanced development feasible. Issues like unsound fiscal deficits, high 
inflation rates and other macroeconomic concerns are important issues that need to be addressed 
by the government. Dealing with such issues becomes easier when the government has effective 
control on the direction of policies. 
Trade flow management techniques complement capital management techniques. Trade 
coordination is important to avert financial sector destabilization and real sector disintegration 
that often come with uneven economic openness. Unfortunately, trade policy is oriented at 
capturing the export markets of industrial economies at the expense of the domestic economies. 
There is therefore a need to upgrade domestic capacity to raise productivity and exploit the 
complementarities that would arise from economic openness and industrialization.  
In the context of the domestic economy, the important role of capacity needs to be 
underscored. Resources are wasted if capacity remains weak. Resources are also wasted if the 
timing and sequencing of regulations are inappropriate. Likewise, resources are wasted if the 
government is captured by rent-seeking and other unproductive profit-seeking activities and there 
                                                 
17 The distinction between ‘regulation’ and ‘control’ should be stressed so there is no misreading of the 
policy implications. Regulation is basically bringing agents to operate within defined rules. Control means 
suppressing agency by imposing an authority’s judgment over agents’.  
is institutional decay. Capacity creates synergy that supports critical economic processes. As the 
economy matures, resources are internalized more effectively and confidence in the economy is 
raised, setting off a cumulative process of accumulation, expansion, and advancement that then 
translates into progress and development. It can be argued further that the lynchpin of this process 
is a government that systematically pulls off interventions and ultimately succeeds in achieving 
desirable outcomes. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
A balance of payments (BOP) consistent procedure for estimating unreported flows was applied 
to ten Asian countries. Estimation results reveal large amounts remain unreported in the BOP, 
reaching US$ 4.7 trillion for the period 1990 to 2007. Regression analysis finds that unreported 
flows increase with reported and accumulated unreported flows. Financial depth and governance 
of the real sector decrease unreported flows, whereas economic growth and some weaknesses in 
the governance of reported flows increase unreported flows. There is also an unambiguous 
finding that unbalanced financial and real sector development mediates the leakage of funds. 
Results indicate that about 0.22 units of unreported flows come from cross-border flows and 
another 0.17 units from domestic resources. Large amounts of funds are lost in the end. Still, 
regression results suggest that there are opportunities for improvement. 
 The sine qua non of an open economy is cross-border flows of resources. Well managed 
flows produce agreeable outcomes like economic expansion along with rising individual incomes 
and welfare. If flows are not well managed, perverse outcomes eventually occur like interruptions 
and/or deteriorations in economic performance that cause social disruptions and household 
misery. The findings in this paper support the proposition that government should apply capital 
flow and trade flow management techniques along with better governance in administering the 
domestic economy in order to reduce unreported flows. Developed or improved capacity enables 
a country to not only internalize funds more effectively but also convert them more fruitfully into 
outcomes that lead to progress and development. 
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Table 1 
 
Total undocumented flows and stock as share to GDP, in constant million dollars 
  
1990-2007 
 
Period 
 
1990s 
 
Period 
 
2000s 
 
Period 
2
)01.0,2(χ  
 level share level share level share ∆ ave. share 
Bangladesh   58,075 6.8 23,927 5.6 34,148 8.5  
China 2,770,314 13.7 1,133,454 14.9 1,636,860 11.7  
India 456,213 4.8 198,058 5.0 258,155 4.9 Yes 
Indonesia 489,184 12.7 178,115 10.6 311,069 15.9  
Malaysia 378,163 20.1 140,714 16.2 237,449 26.0  
Nepal 11,872 11.1 4,748 9.5 7,124 14.2  
Pakistan 86,139 6.7 40,970 6.7 45,169 6.5 Yes 
Philippines 330,225 22.9 120,919 16.1 209,306 30.8  
Sri Lanka 29,548 10.4 15,876 11.7 13,673 8.6 No 
Thailand 178,359 6.5 110,019 7.4 68,340 5.9 Yes 
Total   4,788,093  82.3   1,966,801     2,821,292    
Stock at end period 4,558,070 78.4 1,817,843  2,740,227   
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Stock in the 1990s and 2000s refer to decade stock only. χ2 tests the hypothesis that the reduction in 
share is significant. 
 
Table 2 
 
Summary statistics of unreported flows 
 Mean Maximum Minimum > Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis 
Bangladesh   3,165 5,089 1,650 10 3,182 0.2 -1.3 
China 154,443 270,185 43,919 10 157,191 0.1 0.3 
India 24,408 52,071 4,293 10 25,026 0.4 0.2 
Indonesia 27,008 57,380 10,432 5 19,647 0.9 -0.9 
Malaysia 20,510 45,022 6,914 8 19,623 0.4 0.3 
Nepal 643 1,234 51 9 ,620 0.0 -1.5 
Pakistan 4,837 9,606 2,244 9 4,522 0.6 -0.8 
Philippines 18,492 35,462 4,638 9 19,042 0.1 -0.9 
Sri Lanka 1,653 2,403 838 8 1,551 -0.2 -0.9 
Thailand 9,564 28,605 5,038 6 7,517 2.6 7.8 
Source: Calculations of the author. 
 
Table 3 
 
Balance of Payments of the Philippines, 1990 and 2000, in current million dollars 
 1990 2000 
 Reported Revised Reported Revised 
CURRENT ACCOUNT -2,695 -3,881 -2,225 -12,940 
Goods Exports: F.O.B. 8,186 8,877 37,347 42,732 
Goods Imports: F.O.B. -12,206 -14,009 -43,318 -59,816 
Services 1,483 1,361 -1,870 -1,980 
Income -872 -824 -27 481 
Current Transfers 714 714 5,643 5,643 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT 0 805 138 -2,430 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 2,057 2,119 3,234 -246 
Direct Investment Abroad 0 0 -125 -125 
Direct Investment in Economy 530 530 2,240 2,240 
Portfolio Equity, Debt Securities & Derivatives: Assets 0 0 -646 -646 
Portfolio Equity, Debt Securities & Derivatives: 
Liabilities -50 -50 
137 
137 
Other Investment: Assets 0 62 2,454 -1,026 
Other Investment: Liabilities 1,577 1,577 -826 -826 
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS 593 -212 -1,624 944 
OVERALL BALANCE -45 -1,169 -477 -14,672 
RESERVES ASSETS & RELATED ITEMS 45 1,169 477 14,672 
Reserve Assets 388 388 69 69 
Use of Fund Credit and Loans -343 -343 303 303 
Exceptional Financing 0 0 105 105 
     Supplemental Reserves  1,124  14,195 
     
UNREPORTED FLOWS     
Volume of Unreported Flows 3,530  28,549  
    Export Misinvoicing 691  5,385  
    Import Misinvoicing  -1,803  -16,498  
    Shipment Misinvoicing -122  -110  
    Unreported Remittance 48  508  
    Financial Flight 62  -3,480  
    Debt Stock-Flow Reconciliation & de jure Flows 805  -2,568  
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and calculations of the author.  
Notes: Current accounts items of services, income, and current transfer as well as financial accounts of 
portfolio and derivatives accounts are compressed to save space. The bold texts indicate the corrected 
figures. Direct investments and portfolio accounts as well as reserves assets and related items are 
unadjusted because data for are unavailable for adjustment. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 
 
Revised Balance of Payments of Bangladesh, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts -833.5 -823.9 215.5 308.1 675.8 
Capital Accounts 780.4 0.0 -971.0 -1,320.4 1,547.9 
Financial Accounts 642.0 178.8 -5.5 63.7 1,049.3 
Errors and Omissions -856.1 133.3 1,502.0 938.2 -1,712.1 
Overall Balance -267.2 -511.7 741.0 -10.4 1,561.0 
Reserve Assets and Related Items 267.2 511.7 -741.0 10.4 -1,561.0 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 1,531.5 1,905.3 3,843.9 5,925.3 5,272.4 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. 491.4 154.3 -771.8 -405.7 -188.2 
    Export misreporting 109.7 582.2 1,365.3 2,065.7 1,315.3 
    Import misreporting -471.2 -848.9 -827.9 -1,699.6 -1,856.2 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing -94.3 38.1 -98.3 -190.5 -269.6 
    Unreported remittance 20.1 188.8 82.2 308.7 629.4 
    Capital flight -55.8 132.8 250.5 -78.6 369.3 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -780.4 114.5 1,219.7 1,582.1 -832.5 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 780.4 -114.5 -1,219.7 -1,582.1 832.5 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request. 
 
 
 
Table A.2 
 
Revised Balance of Payments, China, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts 31,325.1 41,114.2 131,839.8 275,100.1 461,251.7 
Capital Accounts 2,102.3 -124.6 -1,143.4 -469.1 5,731.3 
Financial Accounts -4,674.5 26,821.8 15,544.3 58,156.2 140,149.9 
Errors and Omissions -5,307.5 -17,698.6 -10,639.9 -11,869.0 13,716.5 
Overall Balance 23,445.4 50,112.9 135,600.9 320,918.2 620,849.4 
Reserve Assets and Related Items -23,445.4 -50,112.9 -135,600.9 -320,918.2 -620,849.4 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 31,774.2 115,574.3 164,576.7 236,167.1 361,263.1 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. -11,398.6 -27,643.9 -124,907.8 -113,576.2 -159,158.4 
    Export misreporting 20,186.8 69,577.8 127,673.5 158,445.2 147,836.4 
    Import misreporting -1,207.2 -32,050.9 -19,280.4 -58,303.8 -99,736.1 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing 348.3 1,967.5 2,895.8 13,955.7 40,999.7 
    Unreported remittance 0.1 1.5 32.5 185.0 318.7 
    Capital flight -7,929.5 -11,852.0 13,586.4 -705.9 69,739.7 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -2,102.3 124.6 1,108.0 4,571.6 -2,632.5 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 2,102.3 -124.6 -1,108.0 -4,571.6 2,632.5 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request. 
 
 26
 
 
Table A.3 
 
Revised Balance of Payments of India, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts -6,917.0 -14,180.2 -9,936.8 -24,242.8 -31,147.1 
Capital Accounts 2,210.4 -7,290.9 -2,584.7 -4,317.9 382.4 
Financial Accounts 4,798.7 6,379.9 17,198.9 47,314.4 128,404.1 
Errors and Omissions -2,642.9 8,260.6 2,913.9 3,871.6 623.0 
Overall Balance -2,550.7 -6,830.5 7,591.2 22,625.3 98,262.4 
Reserve Assets and Related Items 2,550.7 6,830.5 -7,591.2 -22,625.3 -98,262.4 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 8,545.8 26,140.4 25,366.2 50,493.9 68,695.9 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. 609.7 6,097.9 -1,524.1 -8,071.2 -10,774.2 
    Export misreporting 2,844.9 3,747.7 4,932.0 4,533.4 7,850.0 
    Import misreporting -2,458.4 -11,965.1 -10,025.0 -14,633.0 -21,370.7 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing -284.8 -508.6 -603.7 -4,419.4 -7,399.0 
    Unreported remittance 17.9 109.0 361.1 559.6 1,056.5 
    Capital flight -729.3 2,519.1 6,859.7 22,030.5 30,637.4 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -2,210.4 +7,290.9 2,584.7 4,317.9 -382.4 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 2,210.4 -7,290.9 -2,584.7 -4,317.9 382.4 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request. 
 
 
 
Table A.4 
 
Revised Balance of Payments of Indonesia, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts -1,895.5 -8,001.0 2,609.1 -19,329.2 -16,219.5 
Capital Accounts 3,253.9 6,633.7 -6,137.0 -10,943.0 5,275.4 
Financial Accounts 517.8 6,834.2 -8,943.8 -4,898.7 3,285.4 
Errors and Omissions -2,509.8 -8,888.3 9,966.3 11,140.9 -6,106.6 
Overall Balance -633.5 -3,421.4 -2,505.3 -24,030.1 -13,765.3 
Reserve Assets and Related Items 633.5 3,421.4 2,505.3 24,030.1 13,765.3 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 10,227.1 12,729.7 15,049.2 58,937.9 65,002.2 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. 2,884.6 4,994.8 6,431.0 21,918.9 26,471.1 
    Export misreporting -951.7 -1,390.2 -2,059.0 11,770.2 14,515.6 
    Import misreporting 1,562.3 -730.4 -4,564.6 -32,477.8 -43,372.0 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing 481.8 548.5 1,232.1 998.1 2,056.4 
    Unreported remittance 0.2 2.1 8.6 102.7 88.3 
    Capital flight -3,977.2 -3,424.8 -1,048.0 -2,312.1 240.7 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -3,253.9 -6,633.7 6,137.0 11,277.0 -4,729.2 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 3,253.9 6,633.7 -6,137.0 -11,277.0 4,729.2 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request.  
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Table A.5 
 
Revised Balance of Payments of Malaysia, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts 2,147.8 -8,269.7 11,870.4 31,280.5 38,808.8 
Capital Accounts 853.6 -1,131.6 -366.2 -776.3 -2,003.8 
Financial Accounts 3,291.5 4,954.0 -8,757.7 -16,278.0 3,036.0 
Errors and Omissions 183.3 369.9 -2,854.7 -5,778.3 -2,934.1 
Overall Balance 6,476.3 -4,077.4 -108.1 8,448.0 36,906.9 
Reserve Assets and Related Items -6,476.3 4,077.4 108.1 -8,448.0 -36,906.9 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 5,426.4 16,262.4 24,743.4 33,672.8 55,788.2 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. -4,525.1 2,314.7 -900.6 -4,828.3 -23,763.2 
    Export misreporting 1,919.9 6,402.3 10,783.6 17,082.7 22,515.2 
    Import misreporting 867.8 -6,024.0 -9,256.3 -7,561.8 -15,024.5 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing 227.5 -10.2 1,845.0 1,767.9 2,369.3 
    Unreported remittance 2.4 5.8 10.3 11.9 17.4 
    Capital flight 1,507.4 -2,688.6 -2,481.9 -6,472.3 13,885.8 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -901.3 1,131.6 366.2 776.3 1,976.0 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 901.3 -1,131.6 -366.2 -776.3 -1,976.0 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request. 
 
 
 
Table A.6 
 
Revised Balance of Payments of Nepal, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts -188.5 -388.8 120.0 381.8 386.2 
Capital Accounts 142.5 18.9 -215.4 -237.6 250.3 
Financial Accounts 351.5 393.4 322.9 -163.4 -138.1 
Errors and Omissions -137.6 -16.0 361.1 416.9 -155.9 
Overall Balance 167.9 7.5 588.6 397.7 342.6 
Reserve Assets and Related Items -167.9 -7.5 -588.6 -397.7 -342.6 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 331.7 78.5 1,074.1 1,227.1 956.9 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. -147.7 7.5 -665.5 -493.7 -647.6 
    Export misreporting 4.9 0.4 -46.1 -184.8 76.7 
    Import misreporting 116.6 -0.2 513.0 427.8 214.3 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing -20.8 -33.3 -50.5 -42.9 -67.2 
    Unreported remittance 0.0 0.7 2.2 180.6 292.4 
    Capital flight 47.0 24.9 246.8 113.1 131.4 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -142.5 -18.9 215.4 277.9 -174.9 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 142.5 18.9 -215.4 -277.9 174.9 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request. 
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Table A.7 
 
Revised Balance of Payments of Pakistan, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts -3,686.4 -4,463.6 -1,526.3 -10,171.4 -7,622.2 
Capital Accounts 1,225.2 273.9 -766.7 -3,266.4 2,310.3 
Financial Accounts 1,780.1 1,823.2 -3,096.0 4,467.0 12,057.7 
Errors and Omissions -1,330.5 -578.1 1,323.5 3,268.3 -1,908.5 
Overall Balance -2,011.6 -2,944.6 -4,065.5 -5,702.5 4,837.4 
Reserve Assets and Related Items 2,011.7 2,944.6 4,065.5 5,702.5 -4,837.4 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 3,779.4 2,111.7 2,242.2 10,756.2 6,594.6 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. 1,697.3 1,741.0 1,438.3 6,177.2 -2,710.6 
    Export misreporting -437.3 -61.7 -320.7 -2,091.2 -234.9 
    Import misreporting -1,566.6 -958.0 -1,086.9 -4,155.1 1,284.0 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing -121.6 -143.5 -49.3 -486.2 -639.9 
    Unreported remittance 100.6 48.3 15.6 167.3 251.8 
    Capital flight 327.6 -626.2 3.0 388.0 2,049.7 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -1,225.8 -273.9 766.7 3,468.4 -2,134.3 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 1,225.8 273.9 -766.7 -3,468.4 2,134.3 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request. 
 
 
 
Table A.8 
 
Revised Balance of Payments of the Philippines, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts -3,880.8 -6,863.6 -13,186.2 8,374.6 9,418.8 
Capital Accounts 804.5 -181.7 -2,429.8 -741.5 694.8 
Financial Accounts 2,118.6 9,873.2 -246.2 4,543.6 8,083.3 
Errors and Omissions -211.7 -1,911.9 944.2 -1,021.8 -2,759.4 
Overall Balance -1,169.4 916.0 -14,918.0 11,155.0 15,437.5 
Reserve Assets and Related Items 1,169.4 -916.0 14,918.0 -11,155.0 -15,437.5 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 3,530.2 11,800.9 28,795.2 31,864.2 42,666.5 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. 1,124.3 319.4 14,441.4 -9,493.3 -6,730.1 
    Export misreporting 690.7 698.1 5,384.7 15,323.1 18,334.6 
    Import misreporting -1,802.9 -5,550.8 -16,497.9 -10,409.8 -17,283.2 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing -122.1 -418.5 -356.4 -384.9 -594.0 
    Unreported remittance 48.4 387.6 508.3 1,862.3 1,842.5 
    Capital flight 61.6 4,564.2 -3,480.2 3,102.6 4,430.3 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -804.5 181.7 2,567.8 781.5 -670.8 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 804.5 -181.7 -2,567.8 -781.5 670.8 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request. 
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Table A.9 
 
Revised Balance of Payments of Sri Lanka, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts -420.3 -2,021.8 -1,850.3 -2,080.4 -2,899.2 
Capital Accounts 351.0 170.8 -584.7 -580.2 814.1 
Financial Accounts 817.0 943.4 903.3 -127.4 -462.3 
Errors and Omissions -466.0 107.8 820.2 757.3 -704.8 
Overall Balance 281.6 -799.8 -711.4 -2,030.6 -3,252.2 
Reserve Assets and Related Items -281.6 799.8 711.4 2,030.6 3,252.2 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 1,646.0 1,615.8 2,063.4 2,686.9 2,817.9 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. -165.9 1,038.5 350.6 1,532.3 1,878.0 
    Export misreporting 422.6 -195.8 -362.1 -242.9 -286.7 
    Import misreporting -534.4 -1,052.2 -465.2 -1,155.4 -1,140.3 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing -30.2 -54.2 -62.6 -101.7 -171.8 
    Unreported remittance 20.0 50.2 83.3 162.4 197.3 
    Capital flight 287.9 213.4 456.2 -194.6 -476.5 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -351.0 -50.1 634.0 829.9 -545.3 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 351.0 50.1 -634.0 -829.9 545.3 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request. 
 
 
 
Table A.10 
 
Revised Balance of Payments of Thailand, in current million dollars 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Current Accounts -9,608.5 -18,377.5 6,199.1 -5,387.5 11,243.4 
Capital Accounts 1,089.4 13,272.1 -3,400.6 -4,370.5 -266.7 
Financial Accounts 12,266.6 24,082.6 -8,168.1 12,422.2 -14,793.4 
Errors and Omissions 329.2 -14,468.3 2,715.3 6,351.4 5,737.5 
Overall Balance 4,076.6 4,508.9 -2,654.3 9,015.6 1,920.8 
Reserve Assets and Related Items -4,076.6 -4,508.9 2,654.3 -9,015.6 -1,920.8 
UNREPORTED FLOWS      
Volume of Unreported Flows 6,608.4 25,641.7 10,025.2 8,008.4 19,520.5 
Net de facto Flows: Supplemental res. -841.3 2,649.8 847.9 -3,599.1 15,155.9 
    Export misreporting -841.4 -6,773.6 42.9 2,114.2 779.2 
    Import misreporting -743.3 2,696.8 -3,736.2 -19.4 -4,845.8 
    Shipping cost misinvoicing -753.9 -736.0 555.8 156.0 1,258.5 
    Unreported remittance 11.1 17.1 23.5 8.4 11.3 
    Capital flight 3,168.7 2,146.0 2,266.1 1,340.0 -12,359.1 
Net de jure Flows: EO adjustment -1,090.1 -13,272.1 3,400.6 4,370.5 266.7 
    Debt stock-flow reconciliation, etc. 1,090.1 13,272.1 -3,400.6 -4,370.5 -266.7 
Source: Calculations of the author.  
Note: Only five year intervals and 2007 are shown to conserve space. Full tables are available by request. 
 
 
